INTRODUCTION
In the Australian liberal democratic tradition, the expectation that government be accountable to the people is a product of the electorate's grant of power to government. As government becomes more complex due to the expansion of human activity it regulates there is increased reliance upon official means of facilitating democratic accountability. Indicative of this development is the 20 th century supplementation of traditional Westrninster 1 mechanisms of accountability with administrative law institutions such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman. These supplementary review processes and institutions of 'new administrative law' aim to render the application of discretionary decision-making by government administrators transparent and fair to the individual citizen. This was the primary vision of the Kerr and Bland Committees which framed the need for administrative review agencies against the background of the protection and promotion of individual citizen rights. 2 Three decades later and administrative law agencies such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman continue to encourage good administration and therefore to act for, and 1 2 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney. I would like to thank the referees involved in this process for their helpful insights. I would also like to thank Professor Dennis Pearce for the inspiration for this piece. It has been suggested that the Westminster system is now without 'clarity or credence': Elizabeth Harman, 'The Impact of Public Sector Reforms on Australian Goverronent' in Patrick Weller, John Forster and Glyn Davis (eds), Reforming the Public Service (1993) 16,33. Indeed as Mason J states, 'the doctrine of ministerial responsibility is not in itself an adequate safeguard for the citizen whose rights are affected. This is now generally accepted and its acceptance underlies the comprehensive system of judiCial review of administrative action which now prevails in Australia': The Queen v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1980-81) 151 CLR 170, 222. Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, ParI Paper No 144 (1971) correcting defective decisions which concern the individual citizen?6 Or is it best to increase admiuistrative efficiency and justice through improving the system of overall decision-making and thus assuring the public that the rule of law is safeguarded?7 The wider issue for the system of administrative review is whether such questions expose inherent tension in the aim of promoting good government administration for the benefit of the public. While the original 1970s architects of the 'new administrative law'
were cognizant of such issues s the question as to whether improvements would flow on to the wider system of administrative review, and the related ramifications for efficiency of the administrative process, were viewed as peripheral to the objective of safeguarding the individual.
In conclusion, this article recommends ongoing reflection and evaluation of the changing emphasis of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The future challenge is the practical difficulty of how an accountability institution such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman may preserve equilibrium between the goals of protecting individual rights and improving the overall quality of the administrative system 9 It is suggested that it is critical that the Office retain its current primary focus upon the individual complainant. To travel too far down the path of quality improvement may mean that the Office will fail, or be perceived to fail, to protect the individual complainant and thus remove an important avenue for individual citizens to hold government democratically accountable.
THE COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN AND THE INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN
The architects of the 'new administrative law' focused upon providing redress to the individual citizen. The mould for the approach of the committees was the common law conception of administrative review, with discussion confined largely to the institutions which should supplement courts in their role of reviewing administrative decisions affecting individuals. Three committees considered the introduction of the 'new admiuistrative law': The Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee ('the Kerr Committee') which in October 1971 recommended a new system of administrative law;10 the second committee, the Committee on Administrative Discretions ('the Bland Committee') issued two separate reports in January 1973 and in October 1973; 11 [364] . Stating that the reinforcement of avenues for individual review rights would minimise administrative error and 'stimulate administrative efficiency!, see Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, above n 2, [12] , [364] . The central focus of the institutions created through the reform was to address the individual grievances of citizens. This is not surprising given that the terms of reference 14 of each of the Committees focused upon the redress of individual grievances. Any impact that such redress of individual grievances may have upon improving the overall system of administrative review was seen as incidental to the process of reform. 15 Of course, today, exclusive focus upon the correction of poor government decisionmaking in individual cases is no longer the sole objective associated with the administrative review system. By the mid 1990s the Administrative Review Council observed four objectives of the merits review system: improving the quality and consistency of agency decision-malcing, providing the correct and preferable decision in individual cases, providing an accessible mechanism for merits review, and enhancing the openness and accountability of government.1 6 The current view is that the correction of individual wrongs is not the only path for administrative review to achieve balance between administrative efficiency and individual justice. This focus upon the individual complainant is reflected in the model chosen for the Office. The rejected model as proposed by the Kerr Committee was a 'General Counsel for Grievances'. The Committee favoured locating the 'grievance man within the system of administrative review rather than in the parliament-executive context' 21 This approach would accommodate a larger role for the Office than that of a traditional Ombudsman,22 as apart from the investigation of complaints relating to administration by the public service, additional functions envisaged for the office included the Ombudsman advising complainants of their rights of review before courts or tribunals and extended to proceeding on their behalf in some cases. 23 This suggestion was subsequently revised by the Bland Committee, which 'saw a less extensive role for the Ombudsman than the Kerr Committee'. 24 'The Bland proposals were for an Ombudsman located outside the legal system of administrative review, oriented towards resolution of individual complaints and generally better at swatting flies than huntinglions.'25 This was the model adopted. The Ombudsman model introduced aimed to provide independent investigation and resolution of individual grievances with the power to make recommendations to departments and agencies rather than a role such as that performed by the Administrative Review Council which monitors the whole system of administrative review or suggests systematic reforms to public administration. Report of the Commonwealth Ombudsman it was observed that there was a 30 per cent increase over the previous year in out of jurisdiction complaints and requests for information. 38 It is the second category of complainant, those that are turned away while being within jurisdiction, which are the focus of this article. In Table 1 and 2 the total number of finalised complaints includes the number of complaints within jurisdiction where discretion was used by the Office not to investigate that complaint. This is necessary as the legislation administered by the Office prOVides the discretion not to investigate a complaint in particular circumstances 39 This use of discretion by the Ombudsman does not leave a complainant without further avenues to pursue. For example, apart from using discretion to refer an individual complainant back to the agency they are complaining about, the Office may also use the discretion to transfer complaints to other bodies 40 and also transfer complaints to another Commonwealth or state or territory authority.41 It follows that the actual number of complaints dealt with may be determined through subtracting those where the Office used its discretion to refer individuals away from the total number of complainants who contacted the office. So, for example in Table 1 the number of total finalised complaints is 147 906. When the number of complaints where discretion not to investigate was exercised is removed (34 303) we are left with a total of 113 603 complaints being investigated from 1977 through to 1993. This figure is then converted to a percentage in the final column meaning that the rate of discretion was 16 per cent in 1978-79 (ie: 16 per cent of complainants were turned away in the year the Office began operations) rising to 31 per cent in 1992-93.
EACH FOR THEMSELVES: THE TRADITIONAL CORE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN
A longitudinal comparison 42 of the data in Tables 1 and 2 The data therefore identifies a tripling in the use of discretion by the Office since inception. 47 In Table 1 the 16 year period from 1977-93 has an overall percentage of 23 per cent of complainants or 34 303 people being 'referred away' (this phrase includes complaints redirected back to an agency or referred to other complaint bodies) from the Office, while in Table 2 the 12 year period between 1993-2005 reveals an overall percentage of 65 per cent or 144 685 individuals making a complaint to the Office being subject to the exercise of discretion. The result being that this increasing uSe of discretion to tum away complaints results in a declining number of actual complaints being investigated. ill: Volume 38 complainants are referred back to agencies to raise their, complaint at first instance. It may therefore be suggested that failure to complain to an agency at first instance is the major reason for referring complainants away from the jurisdiction of the Office. This assertion is also supported by statements by Ombudsman such as in the Annual Report observing that the 'conunon reason for not investigating a complaint is that the person has not raised the complaint with the agency involved'. SO Indeed the policy of the Office is that it is a complaint agency of 'last resort,S1 meaning that complainants should raise their issue of complaint with the agency they are complaining about before contacting the Office.
Is the Conunonwealth Ombudsman failing the persons for whom it was established? The data raises the issue as to whether this escalation in the use of the discretion rate contradicts the traditional and ongoing self-proclaimed focus of the Conunonwealth Ombudsman upon the individual complainant. Indeed, concern over this large cohort of complainants being referred away by the Office has resulted in the Commonwealth Ombudsman implementing measures to improve complaint-handling at the departmental level. s2 Importantly, quality in agency complaint-handling skills will decrease, the Office workload. The logic being that as agencies improve their complaint-handling, complaints about those agencies to the Office should both decrease and a complainant should be able to be referred back to that agency at first instance to have their matter reviewed. The aim is therefore twofold: reduce overall individual complaints through improving agency complaint-handling skills and thereby raise the profile of the Office as an agency of last resort.
In this respect two identifiable steps have been implemented by the Office to improve agency complaint-handling. The first is that from 1994 the Office has positioned itself as the standard setter for good complaint-handling and thus entrenched the notion of good complaint-handling within government agencies. To entrench normative change the Office shifts from a single agency approach to looking at how it could improve complaint-handling across the entire government sector. This was initially done through the provision of presentations and publishing reports and guidelines such as: Oral Advice -Some Questions and Issues second step is to address the lack of effective government agency internal complaint mechanisms with the Office stimulating the creation within agencies of internal complaint-handling units. Such units are set up to ensure transparency, responsiveness and objectivity within the agency when dealing with complainants. The Office supports these steps by being perceived to be, and performing, wider functions across the system of administrative review such as becoming a member of the Australian Federal Police Commissioner's Education Advisory Council to help develop a culture of best practice. External observers validate this process, for example, in 1997 the then Prime Minister, John Howard, stated that '[slince its inception the Office has assisted the public sector to improve the way it operates.'54
More recently the need to ensure the Office is not failing complainants it refers away has been recognized by the current Ombudsman, Professor John McMillan (from . Professor McMillan has introduced two internal operational developments: firstly, standing arrangements with agencies for referrals and secondly, introducing a Public Contact Team (,PCT').55 In relation to standing arrangements with agencies the Office has created a referral system whereby complaints are referred directly by the Office to the agency internal complaint-handling unit thereby eliminating the need for the complainant to have to contact and repeat the details of their issue to the agency. This arrangement has been employed with some of the larger individual complaint generating agencies such as the Australian Taxation Office ('ATO') and Centrelink. The supplementary development of the PCT is an attempt to control the guidance and advice of Office staff with respect to the complainants referred back to an agency. The aim of the PCT Office staff is to make referrals appropriately and to attempt to limit review fatigue or 'complaint fatigue'. 56 The complainant is given the contact details for an agency's complaint area and advised to contact the Office again if they are not satisfied with an agency's response. 57 
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Whether the Office is failing the persons for whom it was established is however neither proved nor disproved by either the data which shows high discretion rates or by identifying such operational changes within the Office. To know whether the Office is failing such persons we must know what happens to them when they are referred back to agencies to have their complaint dealt with. Some attempt has been made to ascertain this by the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The 2003-04 Annual Report mentions a Client Satisfaction Survey conducted in May 2004 which shows that the large majority (87 per cent) of complainants advised to take their complaint directly with the agency followed the advice of the Office S8 The 2008-09 Annual Report of the Commonwealth Ombudsman also notes a further client survey on this matter, finding that where the Office advised a person to take up their matter with the agency first, 88% of all complainants did so. The main reasons complainants (12 per cent or 1288 people) did not take up their complaint was that they did not have the confidence that the agency would be helpful, they resolved their problem another way or it was too difficult. 59 Such monitoring is therefore important as respondents who give up before having their complaint resolved are generally attributed to have done so due to suffering from 'complaint fatigue '. 60 These surveys demonstrate concern by the Commonwealth Ombudsman that complainants not be disadvantaged through being referred back to agencies. It remains difficult however to thereby conclude that the outcome of such surveys is that complainants are not disadvantaged by the use of discretion. This is because the surveys focus upon whether the complainant followed up the referral rather than on whether the outcome of the referral was ultimately effective from the perspective of the complainant. This gap requires further exploration, especially in light of evidence that respondents who were referred back to agencies by a state ombudsman had not received a decision they considered to be fair and reasonable. 61 With reference to this gap as to whether complainants receive satisfactory outcomes through being referred back, the Office has used its powers of systemic investigation to monitor whether this use of discretion or lreferral back! to agencies works in practice for the individual complainant. For example, in the Executive Summary of the systemic investigation titled 'Review of the Child Support Agency's CCSA') Complaint Service' Ron McLeod, the then Ombudsman, states: 63 Despite such review there remains ongoing need for systematic empirical mapping of the outcome for individuals who are referred away. This is due to the fact that each method adopted by the Office -Client Surveys or monitoring through systemic investigation -has limitations. For example the above systemic investigation of the CSA Complaint Service fails to assess what proportion of complainants who are referred back to the Complaints Service follow that advice. In short, further empirical work must be undertaken to determine whether complainants referred away from the Office do follow that advice and whether they then gain a satisfactory outcome.
Given the dramatic increase in referrals away from the Office of complainants who are in jurisdiction since the mid 1990s the need for such analysis is critical. This call is reinforced through a background of underwhelming history of independent empirical review undertaken with respect to the operation of the Office. The only comprehensive empirical study by external investigators to determine whether the Office is efficient and effective in terms of its role and function took place in 1991, following the first 15 years of operation of the Office, and was conducted by the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration (,Review'). The Review was conducted from a public administration rather than a legal standpoint, reviewing the 'Ombudsman's jurisdiction, performance, resources and legislation primarily as they affect the overall system of public administration not the legal system'. 64 Indeed, most Australian commentary takes the approach of balancing positive observations against negative comments to arrive at conclusions as to the success of the Office. A prominent example is the 1970s reports responsible for the inception of the Commonwealth Ombudsman where, in endorsing the recommendation for the creation of a Commonwealth Ombudsman, the Bland Committee noted that there is a 'price for having an Ombudsman' and nonetheless concluded that the benefits outweighed the disadvantages 65 The Committee made a number of intuitive evaluations, citing the benefits as the correction of error and the limprovement that occurs in administrative procedure and the care with which officials handle their relations with the public. '66 The negatives were the fact that not all grievances could be solved by the Ombudsman; that decision-making might be delayed or too much time taken to avoid error if a government authority knew it would later be reviewed by the Ombudsman; the fact that there might be a need for more staff; and further rigidity in the exercise of The Commonwealth Ombudsman is in good company, indeed international commentary on the government or classical ombudsmen overwhelmingly supports the success of the institution. 67 Yet a central feature of this analysis is the absence of an accepted or universal methodology used to support such a conclusion 68 The absence of accepted empirical measures opens the debate to the use of statistical data to evaluate whether the Office has failed the individual citizen. Of course such evaluation is open to criticism, as the Office itself observes:
Statistics, of course, tell only part of a story. It is the way they are interpreted that conveys the real message ... While it is difficult to be definitive, the discussion of these possibilities will be better infonned if there is contextual data available on how people perceive the office. 69 Despite the lack of a universally accepted evaluative approach, empirical investigation must be taken up by academics and other independent external investigators. 70 Without such independent analysis the Office, in using such high rates of discretion, remains open to the allegation that it is failing the individual citizens for whom it was established to assist, as even the perception that the Ombudsman is turning away a high number of complainants may undermine the authenticity of claims made as to contributions made to democratic accountability.
Why is there an increasing rate in the use of discretion? While not evidenced by the data, the suggestion made in this article is that the changing discretion rate is the result of a decade long conscious strategy of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. There are at least two interrelated reasons for this strategy: firstly, limited resources and external pressures being brought to bear upon the Office; and secondly, the internal strategic choice of the most recent three Ombudsman to pursue a more proactive role in improving the quality of public administration more generally.
With respect to the first reason, external resource allocation by government will have a critical impact upon the operations of the Office. Just four years earlier, in 1997, the Office reported that the funding of the office had been reduced by 20% over 2 years which linked to the closing of the office in Tasmania and its replacement by a toll free number to Melbourne, the loss of two community liaison officers, one for indigenous people and one for nonEnglish speaking people and an increase in the use of the Ombudsman 1 s discretion ie: complaints that are received but declined any investigation. The discretion rate had gone up over the last year from 40% to 50%, or 4000 cases not being dealt with. 72 Implicit in the above quotes is the notion that the Office is a 'one stop shop'. This means that if the resource allocation to the Office is reduced the internal allocation and decision making must find budget cuts from somewhere and realistically this will be done by the Office 'managing' its reactive complaint-driven role. Of course the Ombudsman is not unique in this respect. The Australian Law Reform Commission has noted the necessity for managing reactive complaint-handling as 'triage' across the entirety of the federal system, involving the initial and prompt sefaration of cases according to the degree of urgency and specialist attention required. 7 External pressure may also playa role in the increasing rate of discretion. In the early 1990s, coinciding with the rise in the use of discretion, several external events impacted upon the Office. Firstly, an Administrative Review Council report of its Multicultural Australia Project recommended 'the Ombudsman ... take a leading and coordinating role in the promotion of administrative review,74 and secondly, the 1991 Review by the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration which investigated the effectiveness of the operation of the Commonwealth Ombudsman stated that while the 'principal role of the Office should remain the investigation and resolution of complaints by individuals', the Office should improve administration by providing feedback to departments on complaints trends, by reviewing its complaint systems and by establishing a specialist investigation unit within the Office to investigate major complaints 75 These external factors either drive and/or complement internal strategy. The second reason for the high rates of discretion may be linked to the choice of the Office to increase emphasis upon the development of the roles of systemic improvement and audit. The complaint-handling role of the Office is reactive. Amongst ombudsmen the practice of controlling numbers of individual complaints handled through discretion is neither new nor surprising. The Office is not alone in making such choices. For example, '[w] hen reviewing the history of the Danish Ombudsman institution, one finds deliberate and consistent efforts to control the number of incoming cases and at the same time make it possible to work at the general level.' 76 As the Office is a one stop shop an increasing discretion rate allows internal redistribution of resources and the development of differing emphasis in relation to its operations.
This assertion is supported -though not proven -through analysis of the individual Ombudsman who utilise increased discretion rates. For example, Table 1 shows Philippa Smith, the Ombudsman between 1993 and 1998, applying discretion rates of 46-63 per cent. The period where she is the incumbent Ombudsman marks the start of the trend to escalate the use of discretion. From the beginning of her term she prioritised non-complaint-handling roles -in particular the system-fixing role. Philippa Smith argued that it was this capacity to review practices, legislative proviSions, and procedures which was unique in the administrative review arena and therefore set the Ombudsman apart from other institutions of administrative review. She observed that a ~riority is the identification and correction of the underlying causes of complaints' 7 and that 'this preventive role is a key part of the modern Ombudsman's role'.7 8 As Table 3 shows this continued use of discretion remains high under her successors. Between the years of 1999 to 2005, the discretion rate is at 70 per cent and above. It confirms that the average discretion rate for these six years is 76 per cent meaning that of the 109 462 complainants that came to the Office only 26 533 had their complaint investigated. The remaining 82 929 were subject to the use of discretion. If this assertion is true -that increased discretion to turn away individual complainants matches an increased focus upon the quality of public administrationthen the use of discretion at the rates identified in Table 3 will continue. Ibis is the case as the strategy of the Office remains one of invigorating attention into the alternate non-individual complaint-handling own motion and audit roles. In the 2007-08 Annual Report Professor McMillan, the current Ombudsman, confirmed that:
The office plans to intensify its own motion and auditing role in the coming years. Individual complaint-handling will always remain the core business of the office, but needs to be supplemented by other techniques for identifying problems and improving government. This is a necessary response to the growing size and complexity of government and the frequent contact that people have with government across all aspects of their lives. 79 Indeed the Office now states in its Annual Reports that it has three roles: individual complaint-handling (its core focus); own motion; and audit.
ONE FOR ALL: INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT-HANDLER AND QUALITY-CONTROLLER
While the Commonwealth Ombudsman was primarily introduced to provide a free and quick mechanism to the individual citizen to ensure that administration by government is transparent, efficient and in accordance with law, there is nothing inherently untoward about the evolving systemic and audit roles. Indeed, when reviewing the development of the Commonwealth Ombudsman there is recurring 79 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report viii.
Volume 38 recognition of the dual roles 80 of individual complaint handler and system improver with the systemic improvement role being consistently acknowledged as a secondary function of the institution.
Thus, there is no impediment to the Commonwealth Ombudsman diversifying its roles. Indeed, apart from its operational legislation, 81 the word 'Ombudsman' itself,82 while being a powerful brand or trade name, contains no prescription as to usage. This Oearly, while the ability of an individual to make a complaint against government and to be heard and have a decision reviewed, remains one of the major purposes of the institution of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, it is only one purpose. There was acknowledgment in the interim report of the Bland Committee that not every discretionary power affects the citizen nor the relationships between the government and the governed and that Commonwealth Ombudsman-Annual Report 7. Arthur Maloney, 'The Ombudsman Idea ' (1979) .. Yet that is not to say that there should be no review at all in any of these cases. 8 The other purpose of the Office therefore exists apart from the individual complainant. Ombudsmen are now expected to not only provide individual redress, but also to produce some form of 'policy impact': administrative policy changes which have consequences into the future and beyond the particular decision complained against. Own motion investigations are a tool used by ombudsmen to promote quality control which aims 'to inculcate standards of lawfulness, fairness, rationality and accountability across public administration for the betterment of all those who deal with government' 89 It is therefore appropriate that the Commonwealth Ombudsman promote an aim of administrative law which is to improve the overall quality of public administration -to provide good managerial normative guidance and thus ensure managerial accountability of the bureaucracy and government agencies to the public. In this sense the Commonwealth Ombudsman should rectify administrative defects as a managerial quality improvement tool.
Despite the legitimacy of this objective, Professor Dennis Pearce warns that ' [t] here is a danger in Australia that the original purpose for the establishment of the office is being lost' 90 The danger Professor Pearce alludes to may include resources increaSingly being diverted from the core functions of ombudsman. The issue raised is not one of whether the movement to embrace auditing or systemic improvement should or may occur. Rather, the danger lies in the degree to which such a shift or an ever expanding jurisdiction will involve the Commonwealth Ombudsman in moving away from its core function of individual complaint handling.
While it is not suggested that the Commonwealth Ombudsman be forever shackled to its historical aims and origins, it is argned that the individual complaint-handling function of ombudsmen not be subverted or lost as the founders' intentions as to the 'new administrative law' do have continuing relevance. 91 Ombudsmen were created to deal with the 'persistent bureaucratic maladies T92 of insensitivity, poor service, arrogance, inflexibility, haste and rudeness by a government department. The normative origins of the ombudsman institution is perhaps best captured in the leading Canadian case on parliamentary ombudsmen, British Dcvelapment Corporation v 
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Friedman [1984] 14 DLR 129. In this decision the Court approved of the following statement of H R Wade in Administrative Law, 5 th ed, who, in explaining the special role the Ombudsmen have come to fill, wrote:
But there is a large residue of grievances which fit into none of the regular legal moulds but are nODe the less real. A humane system of government must provide some way of assuaging thern f both for the sake of justice and because accumulating discontent is a serious clog on administrative efficiency in a democratic country ... What every form of government needs is some regular and smooth-running mechanism for feeding back the reactions of its disgruntled customers, after impartial assessment, and for correcting whatever may have gone wrong. 93
The Commonwealth Ombudsman must not travel so far on its current trajectory of improving the quality of public administration that it is in danger of losing this original purpose.
Resolution of this issue is fundamental to the effective operation of the Ombudsman and therefore to ensuring democratic accountability. The Kerr Committee, in considering the introduction of the 'new administrative law' package in the 1970s commented upon the tension between administrative review and administrative efficiency: 'although administrative efficiency is a dominant objective of the administrative process, nevertheless the achievement of that objective should be consistent with the attainment of justice to the individual.' 94 The implicit warning of the Kerr Committee is to move too far towards administrative efficiency may be at the expense of the individual meaning that 'the chief beneficiary of this Office [will be] the Executive branch of Goverrunent ... '.95
The danger need not be one where the Office actually loses, or has lost sight of its commitment to the individual citizen. Indeed such a conclusion would ignore the current rhetoric of the Office which is to reinforce the importance of the individual complaint-handling role. As noted by Professor John McMillan '[t]he core activity of the office remains the handling of complaints and enquiries from members of the public about government administrative action.'96 Instead the danger may be one of shifts in perception -indeed the perception that the individual citizen holds of justice and accessibility is just as critical as the actuality of the delivery of services. The broader issue, then, is whether the Office will, through an increased use of c1iscretion, lose the confidence of the public and the government. To put it bluntly, as Laking states: The obvious danger of increasing rates of discretion is the perception that government and the public service, rather than the individual citizen, are the greatest beneficiaries of the Office's investigations. The contest for the Office may no longer be one of how to react to demanded rights of the individual citizen against agencies but rather one of ensuring that it maintains the perception of its neutrality and therefore public confidence as the Office increasingly takes up the more interesting pursuit of issues of quality control in government policy. The battle for the Office may therefore be how to best manage an increasingly close relationship with government.
The implication is, from the perspective of the citizen, that while there is the benefit of an improved normative culture of administrative decision-making that an increased quality focus will bring, the drawback is the reduction in the numbers of individual complaints dealt with by the Ombudsman (assuming a continued limit on provision of external resources). In this sense the largest hurdle for the Office will be maintaining positive public perception of its relationship to government. While the historical focus of the Office is upon individual complaints it is also clear that the role of system-fixer is accepted as a justified and increasingly important one. The Office must, however, convince the wider public that it will change the system and that it will do so for the improvement of public administration generally rather than just being a public relations exercise for the benefit of government.
There are also practical considerations behind this suggestion. The first is that, in terms of acting effectively as a quality control agent, it is important that the Office maintain a duality of roles or a mixed approach. That is, administrative deficiencies should be identified by both a top-down or managerial approach and a bottom-up or individual complainant approach. This is to avoid the selection of quality control issues becoming completely either agency driven or managerial. The second is that, in the wider administrative law system, it is critical that the role of the Office as an alternative mechanism for the resolution of grievances be preserved where other avenues of review are not available or inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
The 1970s administrative law reforms manifested a political desire to make public officials accountable for their actions and to provide individuals with effective and accessible remedies for correcting defective public administration. The traditional kernel of Australian administrative law is this centralisation of an individual rights based approach to review with the aim of rendering government decision-makers accountable to the public. In this context 'individual rights' and 'accountability' are broadly understood as being both instruments to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of public governance and as being goals in themselves -indeed both concepts have remained largely unquestioned as holy grails of administrative law. 98 Three decades on and the current approach of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, to increasingly control the numbers and types of individual complaints the office investigates, highlights the necessity for review of the current application of these iconic concepts. Such revision was envisaged as early as 1977 when, in the foreword to In line with Brennan J's prediction, the operational structures of administrative review have changed the citizen's relationship with the machinery of government. There is now an expectation that individual complainants about government administration will be met by good normative complaint handling systems across the whole of government. Once agencies are handling complaints effectively the importance or value of an individual complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman is now more often assessed by its capacity to expose systemic deficiencies and thus result in quality improvement.
Such fundamental change necessitates questioning the ongoing role and value of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in ensuring accountability. The explicit trigger for such review is the high cliscretion rate applied by the Office to turn away individual complainants. An ever present danger for ombudsmen is to be used as a public relations tool of government, a place created by government where citizens may go with their complaints but when they arrive they find themselves being sent away. As the Office pursues the conscious objective of increasing emphasis upon its systemic improvement and audit roles the issue becomes one as to whether the Office has, or will, move too far along the path of improving the bureaucracy at large and in turn minimise the perceived or actual accountability mechanisms which it offers the individual citizen.
The assumption behind this suggestion is that there is a point at which the ombudsman institution is transformed so that it departs from its original role and function and thus implicitly loses credibility with respect to the protection of the interests and rights of an individual citizen. Importantly this is an assumption. The claim is not made that the Commonwealth Ombudsman has reached that point. To date the Commonwealth Ombudsman has increased its use of discretion to decline to deal with an increasing number of individual complainants without fracturing the institution. Indeed the institution has grown in relevance and stature over the last 30 years. lOO July 2007 marked the 30 th anniversary of the establishment of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman which was widely hailed as three decades of success as evidenced by its: • the Senate Standing Committee finding that the Office has made a 'positive contribution to Australian public administration';103 • positive commentary by external observers and ombudsmen;104 and • the ongoing expansion of jurisdiction of the Office supported by successive federal governments 105 Any evaluation of the Commonwealth Ombudsman must be cognizant that both the institution of the Ombudsman and administrative law are 'in perpetual motion ' .106 Perhaps the broader lesson which may then be drawn by observers of Ombudsman, administrative law and policy-makers is that the ombudsman institution may evolve and diversify its functions without compromising its principles or aims. The central import of this article is to highlight the fluidity of the Ombudsman institution in developing new and old functions. This enhanced understanding leads to increased knowledge and improved outcomes in terms of what ombudsmen may offer society. More broadly it reinforces the changing nature of administrative law and highlights the need for careful and timely review of its evolution to ensure it continues to achieve its purpose of enhancing the individual citizen's democratic right to call the government to account. 
